In the literature, essence is formalized in two different ways, either de dicto, or de re. Following [11], we adopt its de dicto formalization: a formula is essential, if once it is true, it is necessarily true; otherwise, it is accidental. In this article, we study the model theory and axiomatization of the logic of essence and accident, i.e. the logic with essence operator (or accident operator) as the only primitive modality. We show that the logic of essence and accident is less expressive than modal logic on non-reflexive models, but the two logics are equally expressive on reflexive models. We prove that some frame properties are undefinable in the logic of essence and accident, while some are. We propose the suitable bisimulation for this logic, based on which we characterize the expressive power of this logic within modal logic and within first-order logic. We axiomatize this logic over various frame classes, among which the symmetric case is missing, and our method is more suitable than those in the literature. We also find a method to compute certain axioms used to axiomatize this logic over special frames in the literature. As a side effect, we answer some open questions raised in [11] .
Introduction
As far back as Aristotle, like the notions of necessity, possibility and contingency, the notion of essence can also be related either to propositions (de dicto) or to objects (de re). The importance of the notion of essence is argued in [5] .
The formalization of essence in terms of de re at least tracks back to Kit Fine. In his writing [6] , a logic of essence is proposed, where formulas of the form F ϕ express that ϕ is true in virtue of the essence of objects which F . A Hilbert-style quantified system E5 is given but without a semantics. In [7] , a possible worlds semantics is presented, and a variant of E5 is shown to be sound and complete for the semantics. In [2] , a propositional version of E5 is established in accompany with an appropriate semantics, and it is shown that the system is sound and complete with respect to the proposed semantics. A new semantics for logics of essence is proposed in [8] .
There are also researchers who formalize essence in terms of de dicto. In [12] , in reconstructing Gödel's ontological argument, accidental truth, i.e. accident is formalized as ϕ ∧ ¬ ϕ, i.e. true but not necessarily true. Accordingly, as the negation of accident, essence is formalized as ϕ → ϕ. It is said that the discussions of essential and accidental propositions at least tracks back to the XIX Century, see [11, p. 53] . A logic of essence and accident is introduced in which essence is treated in the metaphysical usage in [11] , where a complete axiomatization for the logic is shown with respect to the class of all frames. A simple axiomatization for arbitrary frames and its extensions over various frame classes are proposed in [13] , but the case for symmetric frames is missing. Even though the completeness proofs thereof are simple, his method has a defect: on one hand, the canonical relation, thus the canonical frame, is automatically provided to be reflexive; on the other hand, the underlying semantics is defined on arbitrary frames, rather than on reflexive frames. This means that there is a non-correspondence between syntax and semantics in the logic of essence and accident. Oblivious to the literature on the logic of essence and accident, in [14] the author provides a topological semantics for a logic of unknown truths and shows its completeness over the class of S4 models.
The accident operator has various meanings in different contexts. For instance, in the setting of provability logic, 'accident' means 'true but unprovable', thus 'ϕ is accident' means 'ϕ is a Gödel sentence' [10] ; in the setting of epistemic logic, 'accident' means 'unknown truths', thus 'ϕ is accident' means 'ϕ is true but unknown to the agent' [14] .
In this article, we will follow the formalization of essence in [11] , study the notions of essence and accident from viewpoint of de dicto. We will discuss the model theory of the logic of essence and accident, propose some axiomatizations, whose completeness are shown with a more suitable method than those in the literature, and give an automatic method to compute certain axioms needed to characterize this logic over special frames.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the language of the logic of essence and accident. Section 3 compares the relative expressive power of the logic of essence and accident and modal logic. Section 4 explores the frame definability. We propose the bisimulation notion suitable for the logic of essence and accident in Section 5, based on which we characterize the expressive power of this logic within modal logic and within first-order logic in Section 6. Section 7 axiomatizes the logic of essence and accident over various frames. In Section 8, we compare our work with the literature on the logic of essence and accident and the modal logic of Gödel sentence. We conclude with some future work in Section 9.
Language and Semantics
First, we introduce the following language with essence operator and necessity operator as modalities, although we will focus on the language of logic of essence and accident.
Definition 1 (Logical language L(•, )). Let P be a set of propositional vari-ables, the logical language L(•, ) is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | •ϕ | ϕ where p ∈ P. Without the construct •ϕ, we obtain the language of modal logic L( ); without the construct ϕ, we obtain the language of essence and accident L(•). If ϕ ∈ L(•, ), we say ϕ is an L(•, )-formula; if ϕ ∈ L( ), we say ϕ is an L( )-formula; if ϕ ∈ L(•), we say ϕ is an L(•)-formula.
Intuitively, •ϕ is read 'it is essential that ϕ', and ϕ is read 'it is necessary that ϕ'. Other operators are defined as usual; in particular, •ϕ is defined as ¬ • ϕ, read 'it is accidental that ϕ'. Note that • is not the dual of •.
Definition 2 (Model).
A frame is a tuple F = S, R , where S is a nonempty set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation over S. A model is a tuple M = F , V , where V is a valuation function from P to P(S). A pointed model (M, s) is a model M with a designated world s in M. We always omit the parentheses around (M, s) whenever convenient. We sometimes write s ∈ M for s ∈ S. We write R(s) = {t ∈ S | sRt}. We write F T for the class of reflexive frames.
Definition 3 (Semantics)
. Given a pointed model (M, s) and an L(•, )-formula ϕ, the satisfaction relation is defined as follows:
If M, s ϕ, we say ϕ is true, or satisfied at (M, s), sometimes we write s ϕ; if for all s ∈ M we have M, s ϕ, we say ϕ is valid on M and write M ϕ; if for all M based on F we have M ϕ, we say ϕ is valid on F and write F ϕ; if for all F in a class of frames F we have F ϕ, we say ϕ is valid on F and write F ϕ; if the class of frames F in question is arbitrary, then we say ϕ is valid and write ϕ. We say ϕ is satisfiable, if ¬ϕ. The case for a set of formula is similarly defined. Given any two pointed models (M, s) and (N , t), if they satisfy the same L(•)-formulas, we say they are •-equivalent, notation: (M, s) ≡ • (N , t); if they satisfy the same L( )-formulas, we say they are -equivalent, notation: (M, s) ≡ (N , t).
Under the semantics, it is not hard to show that
Proposition 4 is very important. It guides us to find the desired axioms for characterizing L(•) over certain frame classes, as we will see in Section 7.
Expressivity
In this section, we compare the relative expressivity of L(•) and L( ). A related technical definition is introduced as follows.
Definition 5 (Expressivity). Let logical languages L 1 and L 2 be interpreted on the same class M of models,
• L 1 and L 2 are equally expressive, notation:
is less expressive than L( ) on the class of K-models, B-models, 4-models, 5-models.
It is clear that t is a truth-preserving translation. Therefore L( ) is at least as expressive as L(•). Now consider the following pointed models (M, s) and (N , t), which can be distinguished by an L( )-formula ⊥, but cannot be distinguished by any L(•)-formulas:
It is easy to check M and N are both symmetric, transitive, and Euclidean. By induction we prove that for all ϕ ∈ L(•), M, s ϕ iff N , t ϕ. The base cases and boolean cases are straightforward. For the case of •ϕ, it is not hard to show that M, s •ϕ and N , t •ϕ (note that here we do not need to use the induction hypothesis), thus M, s •ϕ iff N , t •ϕ, as desired.
As for the case of D-models, the result about the relative expressivity of L(•) and L( ) is same as previous, but the proof is much more sophisticated, which needs simultaneous induction. Consider the following pointed models (M, s) and (N , s ′ ), which can be distinguished by an L( )-formula p, but cannot be distinguished by any L(•)-formulas:
It is not hard to see that M and N are both serial. By induction on ϕ ∈ L(•), we show simultaneously that for all ϕ,
For (i), we have the following equivalences:
Therefore, (M, s) and (N , s ′ ) cannot be distinguished by any L(•)-formulas.
However, on the T -models, the situation is different. Proof. By the translation t in the proof of Proposition 6, we have
, where the base cases and Boolean cases are similar to the corresponding cases for t, and t
It is straightforward to show that t ′ is a truth-preserving translation, due
Frame correspondence
In [11, Corollary 4.3] , the five basic frame properties, except for symmetry, are shown by using the method of mirror reduction, to be undefinable in L(•). As an open question (Open 4.4 there), the author would like to know which frame properties are definable in L(•). This question is answered partly in [13] , where the following results are established. 
Thus the property of weak connectedness is definable in L(•).
3. [13, Prop. 3.8 without proof] The property of weak-weak-Euclidicity, viz.
. Thus the property of weak-weak-Euclidicity is definable in L(•).
In this section, we first answer affirmatively the case for symmetry, thus completing the spectrum of cases for the five basic frame properties. Apart from this, we will also give other results.
Proposition 10. The frame property of symmetry is definable in L(•).
Proof. Given any frame F = S, R . We show that
For this, let M be an arbitrary model based on F and any s ∈ S. Assume that that M, s p (thus s •¬p → p) and t is a successor of s such that t •¬p. As R is symmetric, tRs. If t ¬p, then by the semantics of •, we should have s ¬p, contrary to the assumption. Then t p, and thus t •¬p → p. Since t is arbitrary, we have s •(•¬p → p). Therefore s p → •(•¬p → p), as desired.
Right-to-left: Suppose that F is not symmetric, to show F p → •(•¬p → p). By assumption, there exist s, t ∈ S such that sRt but not tRs, thus s = t. Define a valuation V on F as V (p) = {s}. Obviously, F , V , s p, thus s •¬p → p. Furthermore, t ¬p, and given any u such that tRu, we have u = s, thus u ¬p, hence t •¬p ∧ ¬p, viz. t •¬p → p. From this and
Proposition 11. The frame property of coreflexivity, viz. ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y), is defined by •p. Thus coreflexivity is definable in L(•).
Proof. Let F = S, R . We will show that F ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y) iff F •p.
Suppose that F ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y). Then given any M based on F and any s ∈ S, if for each t with sRt, we have s = t, then s p implies t p, and thus s •p. Therefore F •p.
Conversely, suppose that F ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y). Then there are s, t ∈ S such that sRt but s = t. Define a valuation V on F such that V (p) = {s}, then s p but t p, and thus F , V , s •p. Therefore F •p.
The following result is an equivalent but different form of Proposition 9, item 1 and item 3, respectively. For the proof details we refer to Appendix A.
Proposition 12.
1. The frame property ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ yRz
Bisimulation
In this section, we propose the suitable notion of bisimulation for the logic of essence and accident L(•). It is announced but without definitions or proofs in [3] that the bisimulation for L(•) is similar to that for the logic of strong noncontingency L( ). We first recall the standard notion of bisimulation for modal logic L( ).
′ implies that the following conditions are satisfied:
there is a t such that sRt and tZt ′ .
We say that (M, s) and
, if there exists a -bisimulation Z between M and M ′ such that sZs ′ . When the models involved are clear, we write it s ↔ s ′ for brevity.
The following result will be used in Proposition 18.
′ be two models, and
implies the following conditions:
Proof. Follows directly from the fact that ↔ is a -bisimulation and the definition of -bisimulation.
However, the notion of -bisimulation is too refined for the logic L(•), as will be shown below. The following example arises in the proof of Proposition 6:
It is not hard to show that M and N are both image-finite models, and that (M, s) and (N , t) satisfy the same L(•)-formulas, but they are not -bisimilar. Therefore, we need to redefine a suitable notion of bisimulation for L(•).
Definition 15 (•-bisimulation). Let M = S, R, V . A nonempty binary relation Z over S is called a •-bisimulation on M, if sZs ′ implies that the following conditions are satisfied:
The following proposition states that we can build more sophisticated •-bisimulations from the simpler ones. For the proof details we refer to Appendix A.
In particular, by Definition 15, one can see that •-bisimilarity is the largest •-bisimulation. And also, •-bisimilarity is an equivalence relation. Note that the proof is highly nontrivial. For the proof details we refer to Appendix A.
Proposition 17. The •-bisimilarity ↔ • is an equivalence relation.
The following proposition indicates the relationship between •-bisimilarity and -bisimilarity: •-bisimilarity is strictly weaker than -bisimilarity. This corresponds to the fact that L(•) is strictly weaker than L( ).
We will show that Z is a •-bisimulation on the disjoint union of M and M ′ with sZs ′ . First, by supposition, we have sZs ′ , thus Z is nonempty. We need only check that Z satisfies the three conditions of •-bisimulation. Assume that xZx ′ . By definition of Z, we obtain x ↔ x ′ . Using item 1 of Proposition 14, we have x and x ′ satisfy the same propositional variables, thus (Inv) holds. For (•-Forth), suppose that xRy and (x, y) / ∈ Z for some y, then using item 2 of Proposition 14, we get there exists y ′ in M ′ such that x ′ R ′ y ′ and y ↔ y ′ , thus yZy ′ . The proof for condition (•-Back) is similar, by using item 3 of Proposition 14.
For the converse, recall the example in Proposition 6. There, let Z = {(s, s), (s, t)}. It is not hard to show that Z is a •-bisimulation on the disjoint union of M and N , thus (M, s)
The following result says that L(•)-formulas are invariant under •-bisimilarity. This means that L(•)-formulas cannot distinguish •-bisimilar models.
The proof continues by induction on the structure of ϕ. The non-trivial case is •ϕ.
Suppose that M, s •ϕ. Then s ϕ but there exists t such that sRt and t ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, (s, t) / ∈ Z. Then by (•-Forth) that there With the notion of •-bisimulation, we can simplify the proofs in the previous sections. We here take Proposition 7 as an example, to show that (M, s) and (N , s ′ ) therein are •-bisimilar, rather than using simultaneous induction. For this, we define
For the converse, we have
Proposition 20 (Hennessy-Milner Theorem). Let M and M ′ be both imagefinite models and s ∈ M and
Proof. Let M and M ′ be both image-finite models and s ∈ M and s ′ ∈ M ′ . Based on Proposition 19, we need only to show the direction from left to right.
. It suffices to show the condition (•-Forth), as the proof for (•-Back) is similar.
Suppose that there exists t such that sRt and s ≡ • t, to show for some 
, which is contrary to the assumption and s •(ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ n → ϕ). Therefore, we have for some
If we remove the condition of 'image-finite', then ↔ • does not coincide with
Example 21. Consider two models M = S, R, V and
This can be visualized as follows:
We have:
• Neither of M and M ′ is image-finite, as s and s ′ both have infinite many successors.
•
For the other direction, suppose that M, s •ϕ. Then s ϕ implies for any n ∈ N, n ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, s ′ ϕ implies for any n ∈ N, n ϕ. As ϕ is finite, it contains only finitely many propositional variables. Without loss of generality, we may assume that n is the largest number of subscripts of propositional variables occurring in ϕ. Then by induction on ϕ, we can show that n + 1 ϕ iff ω ϕ. Thus s
• 
Proof. Based on Proposition 19, we need only show the direction from left to right.
. It suffices to show the condition (•-Forth) holds, as the proof of (•-Back) is similar.
Assume that sRt and s ≡ • t for some t, to show there exists t ′ such that
The condition 'L(•)-saturated' is also indispensable, which can also be illustrated with Example 21. In that example, M is not L(•)-saturated. To see this point, note that the set {¬p 1 , ¬p 2 , · · · , ¬p n } is finitely satisfiable in the successors of s, but the set itself is not satisfiable in the successors of s. In the meantime, (M,
We have seen from Definition 15 that the notion of •-bisimulation is quite different from that of -bisimulation. However, it is surprising that the notion of •-bisimulation contraction is very similar to that of -bisimulation contraction, by simply replacing ↔ with ↔ • .
Definition 23 (•-bisimulation contraction). Let
Under this definition, we obtain that the contracted model (via ↔ • ) is •-bisimilar to the original one, and that the S5-model property is preserved under •-bisimulation contraction. For the proof details we refer to Appendix A. 
Characterization Results

As
•ϕ ↔ (ϕ → ϕ), the logic of essence and accident can be seen as a fragment of standard modal logic, and thus also a fragment of first-order logic. In this section we characterize the logic of essence and accident within standard modal logic and within first-order logic. To make our exposition self-contained, we introduce some definitions and results from e.g. [1] without proofs, refer to Appendix B.
Since
From Lemma 26 and Proposition 22, it follows that Lemma 27. Let (M, s) and (N , t) be pointed models.
We are now close to prove two characterization results: the logic of essence and accident is the •-bisimulation-invariant fragment of standard modal logic and of first-order logic. In the following, by an L( )-formula ϕ (resp. a firstorder formula α) is invariant under •-bisimulation, we mean for any models (M, s) and (
Theorem 28. An L( )-formula is equivalent to an L(•)-formula iff it is invariant under •-bisimulation.
Proof. Based on Proposition 19, we need only show that the direction from right to left. For this, suppose that an
t(ψ)}, where t is a translation function which recursively translates every L(•)-formula into the corresponding L( )-formulas; in particular, t(•ψ) = t(ψ) → t(ψ).
If we can show that M OC(ϕ) ϕ, then by Compactness Theorem of modal logic, there exists a finite set Γ ⊆ M OC(ϕ) such that Γ ϕ, i.e., Γ → ϕ. Besides, the definition of M OC(ϕ) implies that ϕ Γ, i.e., ϕ → Γ, and thus Γ ↔ ϕ. Since every γ ∈ Γ is a translation of an L(•)-formula, so is Γ. Then we are done.
Assume that M, s M OC(ϕ), to show that M, s ϕ. Let Σ = {t(ψ) | ψ ∈ L(•), M, s t(ψ)}. We now claim Σ ∪ {ϕ} is satisfiable: otherwise, by Compactness Theorem of modal logic again, there exists finite Σ ′ ⊆ Σ such that ϕ ¬ Σ ′ , thus ¬ Σ ′ ∈ M OC(ϕ). By assumption, we obtain M, s ¬ Σ ′ . However, the definition of Σ and Σ ′ ⊆ Σ implies M, s Σ ′ , contradiction. Thus we may assume that N , t Σ ∪ {ϕ}. We can show (M, s) ≡ • (N , t) as follows: for any ψ ∈ L(•), if M, s ψ, then M, s t(ψ), and then t(ψ) ∈ Σ, thus N , t t(ψ), hence N , t ψ; if M, s ψ, i.e., M, s ¬ψ, then M, s t(¬ψ), and then t(¬ψ) ∈ Σ, thus N , t t(¬ψ), hence N , t ¬ψ, i.e. N , t ψ.
We now construct the ultrafilter extensions of M and N , denoted by ue(M) and ue(N ), respectively. According to the fact that (M, s) ≡ • (N , t) and Lemma 27, we have (ue(M), π s ) ↔ • (ue(N ), π t ). Since N , t ϕ, by Lemma 26, we have ue(N ), π t ϕ. From supposition it follows that ue(M), π s ϕ. Using Lemma 26 again, we conclude that M, s ϕ.
Theorem 29. A first-order formula is equivalent to an L(•)-formula iff it is invariant under •-bisimulation.
Proof. Based on Proposition 19, we need only show the direction from right to left. For this, suppose that a first-order formula α is invariant under •-bisimulation, then by Proposition 18, we have that α is also invariant underbisimulation. From van Benthem Characterization Theorem (Proposition 47), it follows that α is equivalent to an L( )-formula ϕ. From this and supposition, it follows that ϕ is invariant under •-bisimulation. By Theorem 28, ϕ is equivalent to an L(•)-formula. Therefore, α is equivalent to an L(•)-formula.
Axiomatizations
This section deals with the axiomatization for the logic L(•) over various classes of frames. We first handle the minimal system. Definition 30 (Axiomatic system K • ). The axiomatic system K • consists of all propositional tautologies (TAUT), uniform substitution (US), modus ponens (MP), plus the following axioms and inference rule:
is a finite sequence of L(•)-formulas in which each formula is either an instantiation of an axiom, or an element of Γ, or the result of applying an inference rule to prior formulas in the sequence. Formula ϕ is provable in K
• , or a theorem, notation: ⊢ ϕ, if there is a derivation from the empty set ∅ to ϕ in K
• .
Intuitively, Axiom •⊤ says that tautologies are not accidentally true (i.e. ¬ • ⊤); Axiom •¬ says that whatever is accidentally true is always true (i.e.
•p → p); Axiom •∧ says that if the conjunction is accidentally true, then at least one conjunct thereof is accidentally true (i.e.
•(p ∧ q) → •p ∨ •q); Rule R stipulates the almost monotonicity of the essence operator.
When it comes to completeness, any of the axioms •⊤, •¬ and •∧ is indispensable in the system K • , otherwise the subsystems will be not complete. As for Axiom •⊤, define a nonstandard semantics as , except that all formulas of the form •ϕ are interpreted as ¬ϕ. We can check under this semantics, K
• − •⊤ is sound, but •⊤ is not valid, which means that •⊤ is not provable
However, •⊤ is valid under the standard semantics . Therefore, K
• − •⊤ is not complete with respect to the semantics . As for Axiom •¬, define another nonstandard semantics as , except that all formulas of the form •ϕ are interpreted as ϕ. One can show that under the semantics , the subsystem K
• − •¬ is sound, but •¬ is not valid. Thus there is a validity (i.e. Axiom •¬) under the standard semantics , which is unprovable in K
• − •¬, and hence K
• − •¬ is not complete with respect to the semantics . As to the indispensability of Axiom •∧, the situation is more complicated. For this, we need to switch the interpretations of • and •, and the soundness of a system is defined as "all of the theorems involved in the occurrence of • are invalid", where the notion of validity is defined as usual (see Definition 3). Then one can check that under this specification, the subsystem K
• − •∧ is sound, but Axiom •∧ is valid, thus •∧ is not provable in K
• − •∧. However, •∧ is valid under the semantics , hence K
• − •∧ is not complete with respect to the semantics .
From the indispensability of the axioms •⊤, •¬ and •∧, we have also shown that all of the three axioms are independent in the system K
• . Note that our axiomatic system K
• is equivalent to, but slightly different from Steinsvold's B K in [13] . We can show easily that K
• is sound with respect to the class of all frames.
Using Axiom •∧ and Rule US, we can show by induction on n ∈ N that
We are now ready to build the canonical model for K • .
Definition 32 (Canonical model for
• , where
The canonical model here is not reflexive, which is consistent with the semantics of •, in contrast to the definition in [13] (see Section 8).
Lemma 33 (Truth Lemma). Let s ∈ S c and ϕ ∈ L(•). We have
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The only nontrivial case is •ϕ, that is to show, M c , s •ϕ ⇐⇒ •ϕ ∈ s. '⇐=': Suppose towards contradiction that •ϕ ∈ s but M c , s •ϕ, then s ϕ but there is a t ∈ S c with sR c t and t ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, we have ϕ ∈ s but ϕ / ∈ t. Thus •ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s. Since sR c t, we obtain ϕ ∈ t, contradiction.
By the induction hypothesis, we need only show that ϕ ∈ s but there is a t ∈ S c with sR c t and ¬ϕ ∈ t. First, ϕ ∈ s follows from the supposition •ϕ / ∈ s, Axiom •¬ and Rule US. Besides, we show that the set {ψ | •ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s} ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent.
The proof proceeds as follows: if the set is not consistent, then there exist
, we have •ϕ ∈ s, contrary to the supposition.
We have thus shown that {ψ | •ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s} ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent. By Lindenbaum's Lemma, there is a t ∈ S c such that {ψ | •ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s} ∪ {¬ϕ} ⊆ t. Since ϕ ∈ s but ϕ / ∈ t, we obtain s = t. Thus sR c t and ¬ϕ ∈ t, as desired.
Based on Lemma 33, it is a standard exercise to show that
Theorem 34 (Completeness of K • over K-frames). K • is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all frames.
The same story goes with K
• and the class of serial frames. But note that M c is not necessarily serial. Thus we need to transform M c into a serial model, in the meanwhile the truth-values of L(•)-formulas should be preserved.
Theorem 35 (Completeness of K
• over D-frames). K • is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of D-frames. 
Theorem 36 (Completeness of K
• over T -frames). K • is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of T -frames.
It is now obvious that R T is reflexive.
It suffices to show that the truth-values of L(•)-formulas
We now consider the extensions of the system K • . The table below indicates the extra axioms and the corresponding systems, with on the right-hand side the classes of frames for which we will demonstrate completeness.
Notation Axioms
Systems Frame classes
Note that Axiom •4 is different from the axiom B4 in [13, p. 95], i.e.
•p∧p → •(•p ∧ p). One can show that B4 is provable in K4
• , with the aid of Axioms •4, •∧ and Rule US. It is shown in [13, Prop. 3.6 ] that K
• + B4 is sound and complete with respect to the class of 4-frames (weakly transitive frames, and also S4-frames). The same argument goes with the system K4
• . But we will show that K4
• is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of 4-frames within our framework. And we can see that K4
• is simpler than K
• + B4. We can compute the above axioms from the standard ones in modal logic. But note that the point here is Proposition 4. In other words, the underlying class of frames is F T , the class of reflexive frames, rather than the class of all frames.
The equivalent transition from (1) to (2) follows from Proposition 4. By simplification, we obtain the axiom B4 in [13, p. 95], i.e. (3).
The equivalent transitions from (4) to (6) follow from Proposition 4. By simplification and using Rule RE• (i.e. ϕ ↔ ψ •ϕ ↔ •ψ ), we obtain Axiom •B, i.e. (7).
The equivalent transition from (8) to (9) follows from Proposition 4. The equivalent transition from (10) to (11) is due to the validity of (ϕ
The implicative (rather than equivalent) transition from (11) to (12) is because Axiom •B is invalid on Euclidean frames. In this way, we get the axiom (12), i.e.
•5, or following the term in [13, p. 100], B5. From the above transition from (8) to (12), we can see that the standard axiom 5 in modal logic is equivalent to •B & • 5, rather than •5. This tells us that •B & • 5 is the desired axiom for characterizing the logic of essence and accident over symmetric and Euclidean frames, but •5 may not be the desired axiom for characterizing this logic over Euclidean frames, as one can show. When considering the case for transitivity, the difficulty will arise. Because it is possible that sR c t and tR c u and u = s. By the definition of R c , we do not have sR c u. We call this kind of world s (viz. u) a non-transitive world w.r.t. R c . Thus we need to transform M c into a transitive model. Notice that the truth-values of L(•)-formulas should be preserved under the transformation.
Theorem 37 (Completeness of K4
• over 4-frames). K4
• is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of 4-frames.
Proof. Define M c as in Definition 32 w.r.t. K4
c s for some t ∈ S c }. We first show that R Tr is transitive. Assume for any s, t, u ∈ S c that sR Tr t and tR Tr u, to show sR Tr u. We consider the following cases.
• sR c t and tR c u. If s = u, then by definition of R Tr , it is obvious that sR Tr u. We only need to consider s = u. In this case, suppose for any ϕ ∈ L(•) that •ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s, by Axiom •4 and Rule US, we get • • ϕ ∈ s. Then from sR c t, we can infer •ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ t. Combining this and tR c u, we obtain ϕ ∈ u. Therefore, sR c u, and thus sR Tr u.
• sR c t, and for some s ′ , tR c s ′ and s ′ R c u and t = u. Then it is obvious that sR c u, thus sR Tr u.
Proof. Let s, t ∈ S c . Suppose sR c t (thus s = t), to show tR c s. For this, assume for any ϕ such that •ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ t, we need only show ϕ ∈ s. If ϕ / ∈ s, i.e. ¬ϕ ∈ s, then using Axiom •B and Rule US, we obtain •(•¬¬ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∈ s, viz.
•(•ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∈ s. Besides, from ¬ϕ ∈ s it follows that •ϕ → ¬ϕ ∈ s. We have thus shown that •(•ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∧ (•ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∈ s. By supposition and the definition of R c , we conclude that •ϕ → ¬ϕ ∈ t, that is, •ϕ ∧ ϕ / ∈ t, in contradiction to the assumption. Therefore ϕ ∈ s.
From Proposition 10, Theorem 34 and Proposition 39, it is immediate that
Theorem 40 (Completeness of KB
• over B-frames). KB
• is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of B-frames.
Theorem 41 (Completeness of KB
• over T B-frames). KB
• is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of T B-frames. As we mentioned in the footnote 5, system K • + •5 may not be complete with respect to the class of Euclidean frames. Despite this, we indeed have the following result, i.e. Theorem 42. For this, however, we cannot provide that the canonical relation R c in Definition 32 is Euclidean, since it may be the case that sR c t and sR c u but t = u (thus it does not hold that tR c u). We call this kind of world a non-Euclidean world w.r.t. R c . We need to handle these special worlds, to transform M c into an Euclidean model. Note that the transformation need to keep the symmetry of R c , and also preserve the truth-values of L(•)-formulas.
Theorem 42 (Completeness of KB5
• over B5-frames). KB5
• is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of B5-frames.
Proof. The validity of Axiom •5 can be derived from a similar argument to Proposition 12.2, and the soundness of KB
• follows from Theorem 40. Define M c as in Definition 32 w.r.t. KB5
Euc is Euclidean. Assume for any s, t, u ∈ S c that sR Euc t and sR Euc u, to show that tR Euc u. According to the definition of R Euc , we consider the following cases.
• sR c t and sR c u. Consider two subcases.
-t = u. It is obvious that tR Euc u.
-t = u. Suppose for any ϕ that •ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ t, we need to show ϕ ∈ u, from which we have tR c u. Since R c is symmetric (Proposition 39), from sR c t it follows that tR c s. Then the supposition implies ϕ ∈ s.
Moreover, we have •ϕ ∈ s, for otherwise, ¬ • ϕ ∈ s, by Axiom •5 and Rule US, •(•ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∈ s; we also have •ϕ → ¬ϕ ∈ s, then from sR c t follows •ϕ → ¬ϕ ∈ t, contrary to the supposition. We have thus shown ϕ ∧ •ϕ ∈ s. This entails ϕ ∈ u due to sR c u. Then tR c u, and thus tR Euc u.
• sR c t, and s ′ R c s and s ′ R c u and s = u for some s ′ ∈ S c . Then uR c t. Since R c is symmetric (Proposition 39), we obtain tR c u, thus tR Euc u.
• sR c u, and s ′ R c s and s ′ R c t and s = t for some s ′ ∈ S c . Then it is clear that tR c u, thus tR Euc u.
• [13] . In [10, Prop. 4 .1], a proof system GS 0 is established and shown to be complete, by proving GS 0 is equivalent to K EA in [11] .
The canonical relation in [11] may not apply to some other frame classes, just as the canonical relation defined in [9] in the setting of noncontingency logic (cf. [4, p. 101] ). We here compare our method to that proposed in [13] more detailedly, where, to show the completeness of B K (an equivalent axiomatization of K
• ) and its extensions, the canonical model M c = S c , R c , V c is defined as follows:
Under this definition, the completeness proof is simpler than ours. However, this definition has its defect: on one hand, the canonical relation, thus the canonical frame, is automatically provided to be reflexive; on the other hand, the semantics of L(•) is defined on arbitrary frames, rather than on reflexive frames, and it is also shown in [13, Prop. 3.5] that B K , equivalently, our K
• , is sound and complete with respect to the class of all frames. This means that there is a non-correspondence between syntax and semantics in the logic of essence and accident.
In comparison, by defining the canonical relation R c as in Definition 32, we do avoid the defect existing in [13] , since our M c is not reflexive. Besides, our system K4
• is simpler than K • + B4. And moreover, by using a translation from L( ) to L(•) on reflexive frames, we obtain a complete axiomatization for symmetric frames, which, to our knowledge, is missing in the literature. We also have studied the model theory of L(•), including the expressive power, frame definability, the proposed suitable notions of bisimulation and bisimulation contraction.
Closing words
In this paper, we compared the relative expressivity of the logic of essence and accident L(•) and modal logic, and study the frame definability of L(•). We proposed a notion of bisimulation for L(•), based on which we characterized this logic within modal logic and within first-order logic. We axiomatized the logic of essence and accident over various classes of frames, with a more suitable method than those in the literature. We found a method to compute certain axioms used to axiomatize this logic over special frames in the literature. As a side effect, we answered some open questions raised in [11] .
As we claimed before, •5 may not be the desired axiom for characterizing L(•) over Euclidean frames. We suspect that the validity •5 ′ , i.e. ¬p →
•(•¬p → p), on Euclidean frames is not provable in K • + •5. Besides, We conjecture that K
• + •5 ′ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of Euclidean frames. We leave this for future work.
A Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 12:
, then there exists M = S, R, V based on F and s ∈ S such that M, s •p ∧ p but s •(•p ∧ p). It follows that there is a t ∈ S such that sRt and t •p ∧ p, thus s = t. Since s •p ∧ p, we have t p, and then t •p, hence there is a u ∈ S such that tRu and u p, and furthermore t = u and s = u. Now by supposition, we obtain sRu. However, from s •p ∧ p and sRu, we get u p, contradiction. 
, and we can now conclude that
It follows that there is a t ∈ S such that sRt and t •¬p → p, i.e. t •¬p ∧ ¬p. Since s ¬ • ¬p, we have s ¬p and there is a u ∈ S such that sRu and u p. It is not hard to check that s = t, s = u and t = u. Now by supposition, we obtain tRu. However, from t •¬p ∧ ¬p and tRu, we get u ¬p, i.e. u p, contradiction. Now suppose F ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz ∧ x = y ∧ x = z ∧ y = z → yRz), to show F ¬ • ¬p → •(•¬p → p). By supposition, there are s, t, u such that sRt, sRu, s = t, s = u, t = u but not tRu. Define a valuation V on F = S, R such that V (p) = {u}. By definition and s = u, t = u, we have s p and t p. Given any t ′ such that tRt ′ , due to not tRu, we have t ′ = u, thus t 
Proof of Proposition 16:
Suppose that Z and Z ′ are both •-bisimulations on M, to show Z ∪ Z ′ is also a •-bisimulation on M. Obviously, Z ∪ Z ′ is nonempty, since Z, Z ′ are both non-empty. We need to check that Z ∪ Z ′ satisfies the three conditions of •-bisimulation. For this, assume that (s, s ′ ) ∈ Z ∪ Z ′ . Then sZs ′ or sZ ′ s ′ . (Inv): If sZs ′ , then as Z is a •-bisimulation, we have: given any p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s ′ ∈ V (p); if sZ ′ s ′ , then as Z ′ is a •-bisimulation, we also have: given any p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s ′ ∈ V (p). In both case we have that given any p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s ′ ∈ V (p). (•-Forth): Suppose that sRt and (s, t) / ∈ Z ∪ Z ′ , then (s, t) / ∈ Z and (s, t) / ∈ Z ′ . If sZs ′ , then since Z is a •-bisimulation on M, there exists t ′ such that s ′ Rt ′ and (t, t ′ ) ∈ Z, and hence (t, t ′ ) ∈ Z ∪ Z ′ ; if sZ ′ s ′ , then since Z ′ is a •-bisimulation on M, there exists t ′ such that s ′ Rt ′ and (t, t ′ ) ∈ Z ′ , and hence also (t, t ′ ) ∈ Z ∪ Z ′ . Therefore in both cases, there exists t ′ such that s ′ Rt ′ and (t, t ′ ) ∈ Z ∪ Z ′ . (•-Back): The proof is similar to that of (•-Forth).
Proof of Proposition 17:
We need only show that ↔ • satisfies the three properties of an equivalence relation.
Reflexivity: Given any model M = S, R, V and s ∈ S, to show that (M, s) ↔ • (M, s). For this, define Z = {(w, w) | w ∈ S}. First, Z is nonempty, as sZs. We need only show that Z satisfies the three conditions of •-bisimulation. Suppose that wZw.
It is obvious that w and w satisfy the same propositional variables, thus (Inv) holds; suppose that wRt and (w, t) / ∈ Z for some t ∈ S, then obviously, there exists t ′ = t such that wRt ′ and tZt ′ , thus (•-Forth) holds; the proof of (•-Back) is analogous. 
B Preliminaries
Definition 44 (Ultrafilter Extension). Let M = S, R, V be a model. We say that ue(M) = U f (S), R ue , V ue is the ultrafilter extension of M, if
• U f (S) = {u | u is an ultrafilter over S}, where an ultrafilter u ⊆ ℘(S) satisfies the following properties:
-X ∈ u and X ⊆ Z ⊆ S implies Z ∈ u -For all X ∈ P(S), X ∈ u iff −X / ∈ u (−X means the complement of X)
• For all s, t ∈ U f (S), sR ue t iff for all X ⊆ S, X ∈ t implies λ(X) ∈ s, where λ(X) = {w ∈ S | there exists v such that wRv and v ∈ X}
• V ue (p) = {u ∈ U f (S) | V (p) ∈ u}.
Definition 45 (Principle Ultrafilter). Let S be a nonempty set. Given any s ∈ S, the principle ultrafilter π s generated by s is defined as π s = {X ⊆ S | s ∈ X}. It can be shown that every principle ultrafilter is an ultrafilter.
Proposition 46. Let M be a model and ue(M) be its ultrafilter extension. Then ue(M) is L( )-saturated and (M, s) ≡ (ue(M), π s ).
Theorem 47 (van Benthem Characterization Theorem). A first-order formula is equivalent to an L( )-formula iff it is invariant under -bisimulation.
